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When the UK leaves the EU, trade arrangements between the UK and EU will change. Most of the options 
for future UK-EU relationships currently under discussion imply increased trade barriers, which will reduce 
trade and also have effects on output and prices. In this paper, we use a multi-market partial equilibrium 
model to analyse the vulnerability of 122 manufacturing industries to Brexit. In all five Brexit scenarios we 
model, there is an overall reduction in UK manufacturing output. Output grows in some industries but at 
the expense of higher consumer and intermediate goods prices. High tech and medium-high tech sectors 
are more at risk of a decline in domestic production than lower tech sectors. In most areas of the country, 
demand for high-skilled workers falls more than for medium and low-skilled workers. 
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When the UK leaves the EU, trade arrangements between the UK and EU will change, but the form of the 
new arrangements was still far from clear even towards the end of 2018. Several options were under 
discussion, ranging from the UK having some form of customs union with the EU and retaining 
membership of the Single Market, to the UK trading on WTO terms with the EU. Each of these options 
entails increased trade barriers. Higher barriers will inevitably reduce trade and also have effects on output 
and prices. To the extent that the UK manages to sign new free trade agreements with third countries, some 
of these effects may be mitigated. 
The effects of Brexit will vary across industries and sectors. The importance of the EU either as a 
destination market for UK producers or as a supplier in the UK market differs between industries; as do 
the level of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the existing empirical 
literature on the impact of Brexit through the use of a multi-market partial equilibrium (PE) model applied 
to UK manufacturing industries and sectors. 
Most of the existing formal empirical work is based on the application either of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models (Dhingra et al., 2017; Ciuriak et al., 2015; Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; HM 
Treasury, 2016) or of gravity models (Ebell and Warren, 2016).1 The advantage of a PE model is that it 
enables the effects of policy to be modelled at a much finer level of sectoral disaggregation than is possible 
within a CGE framework; with much more up-to-date trade data. For example, the UK Government’s 
internal cross-Whitehall model uses a Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset with up to 57 sectors, 
within which (in the limited results which have been released) there appear to be nine manufacturing sectors. 
In contrast, we have 122 manufacturing industries, based on the 4-digit classes of ISIC Revision 4, and the 
data are based on 2016 trade flows. This greater level of disaggregation matters in several respects. 
First, and most obviously, it allows for a much more detailed examination of the possible impacts on 
prices, output and trade in specific industries. We can model more accurately the variation in trade policy 
(i.e., tariffs and non-tariff barriers) across different industries, and also across different trading partners.  
Second, we show that, at least for some sectors, aggregation makes a difference: the aggregated results 
of analysis conducted at a disaggregated level can be significantly different from the results of the same 
analysis done at the aggregated level. 
Third, the detailed level of aggregation we work with makes it possible to consider the impact across 
industries according to their underlying characteristics, for example their technological intensity. 
Finally, as well as specific industries or sectors, we can examine the impact on different areas of the 
UK, and the impact on different categories of labour. By using information available on output and 
employment at the sub-national level, we can provide a much more accurate assessment of the possible 
impact of different Brexit scenarios on geographic areas and labour markets than can be done with a more 
aggregate CGE modelling framework. 
A PE modelling approach has disadvantages as well as advantages. CGE models take account of both 
product and factor market linkages, which our model does not. These linkages can show how changes in 
employment in some sectors might affect other sectors through their impact on wages; or how changes in 
UK agriculture might affect food manufacturing, or changes in the motor vehicle components industry 
could affect the car industry. However, the fact that data on input-output linkages or on skill-intensity are 
available only at a fairly aggregated level limits the degree of disaggregation possible in a CGE model. 
The PE modelling results we present here should therefore be seen as illustrating the direct, first-order 
impacts of policy. The longer-run implications will depend on how quickly and how easily businesses can 
adjust to the new economic landscape after Brexit. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the policy context. In 
Section 3, we review selected recent analytical studies of the impact of Brexit to date, and in Section 4, we 
discuss the modelling approach adopted in our work and our data sources. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, 
look at the impact of five Brexit scenarios on different manufacturing sectors, and on labour markets across 
different geographic areas. Section 7 provides a summary of ‘average impact’ results depending on the 
modelling assumptions and the version of the partial equilibrium model used. 
 
 
                                                     
1 The report by Tetlow and Stojanovic (2018) provides a summary of the recent 14 studies on the long-term impact of Brexit, and highlights the 
differences in the assumptions used in economic models that drive the large variation in the respective predictions of the long-term impact.  
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2. The Policy Context 
 
Because the UK is in the EU Customs Union (CU) and the European Single Market (SM), all trade between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union is tariff-free and subject to low non-tariff barriers. 
Membership of the CU gives the UK tariff-free market access for all exports to and imports from the EU, 
with a common external tariff (CET) for imports from third countries. The common external trade policy 
eliminates the need for rules-of-origin checks at intra-EU borders because the regime for imports from 
outside the customs union is the same at all points of entry. Membership of the SM means that a product 
placed for sale in any given EU country can be sold in any other EU country without any further need to 
prove that EU standards have been met. The absence of tariffs, origin checks and regulatory checks at intra-
EU borders results in shorter transport times and lower trade costs. 
These low trade costs, coupled with geographic proximity, explain why the EU is the UK’s largest 
trading partner. In 2017, 49% of total UK exports and 54% of total UK imports were with the EU. A 
further 15% of exports and 14% of imports were with the nearly 70 countries with whom the EU (including 
therefore the UK) has free trade agreements (FTAs), and over 5% of both imports and exports are with 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).2 
Trade in goods is still the largest part of trade with the EU (and other partner countries). In 2016, goods 
exports from the UK to the EU were worth £145 billion, with services exports £90 billion. On the import 
side, trade was even more weighted towards goods: UK imports of goods from the EU were worth £242 
billion as compared to £76 billion of services imports. Overall, in 2016, goods exports accounted for 55% 
of UK total exports, and goods imports accounted for 74%.3 
Brexit is likely to lead to some reorientation of the UK’s trade, as well as some change in its composition. 
The policy alternatives for the future trade relationship with the EU that were still being discussed late in 
2018 included: a full or partial customs union with the EU; membership of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) which would mean the UK remaining in the SM; a free trade agreement (FTA) with or without 
Single Market access to the EU; or trading on WTO terms. As well as negotiating the terms of future trade 
with the EU, the UK also needs to establish the basis upon which it will trade with the EU-FTA countries. 
The UK Government has repeatedly stated that it would like to roll over (‘grandfather’) these agreements. 
Leaving the EU is therefore likely to increase the costs of trade between the UK, the EU and the current 
EU-FTA partner countries. If the UK does not agree a new FTA with the EU and does not grandfather 
the existing 37 FTAs, tariffs will be reintroduced on trade between the UK and these countries, and non-
tariff barriers will increase. But even if the UK and the EU agree an FTA that covers all sectors and has 
zero tariffs on all goods,4 and if the UK rolls over the existing FTAs, there will be additional costs associated 
with rules-of-origin compliance, if the UK is no longer in a CU. These extra barriers to trade flows imply 
that even the most ambitious UK-EU FTA will not replicate the levels of market access or keep trade costs 
as low as they are now (Lydgate and Winters, 2018). In all cases, Brexit is likely to affect trade flows between 
the UK, the EU and the EU-FTA partners. 
Much has been made by some politicians and commentators of the opportunities the post-Brexit UK 
will have to make new FTAs with countries such as the US and India with whom the EU does not currently 
have FTAs. Any such agreements should reduce trade barriers and mitigate at least some of the effect of 
increases in trade barriers with the EU and with the existing EU-FTA partners, and we consider the extent 
to which agreements with third countries could offset the effects of withdrawal from the EU. 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Most of the existing empirical literature concludes that Brexit, by making trade between UK and the EU 
more costly, will have negative economic consequences for the UK economy. Different approaches have 
been used to estimate these effects. Table 1 summarises the key features and results of some of this 
                                                     
2 Source: UN Comtrade. 
3 Source: ONS Pink Book 2017. In 2016, the value of UK’s goods exports stood at £302 billion, increasing from £289 billion in 2015. Imports of 
goods were worth £437 billion, up from £407 billion in 2015. 
4 Statement by President Donald Tusk (7 March 2018) on draft guidelines on the framework for the future relationship with the UK explicitly 











In advance of the EU referendum, Ciuriak et al. (2015) used a multi-sector, multi-region CGE model 
to compare the trade-related costs of the UK’s exit with the potential benefits of alternative trade policies. 
Their simulation results suggest that by 2030 a ‘hard’ Brexit (to WTO terms) will lower UK’s real GDP by 
2.8% while remaining in the EEA will result to a fall of only 1%. 
Dhingra et al. (2017) also use a CGE trade model with 31 sectors and 35 countries (regions) to estimate 
long-term costs of Brexit. They model the effects of ‘soft’ Brexit (the UK remains in the Single Market) 
and ‘hard’ Brexit (the UK and the EU trade on WTO terms) by simulating changes in trade costs. They 
find that increases in bilateral tariffs and non-tariff barriers between the UK and the EU, and the exclusion 
of the UK from future EU integration would lead to UK welfare losses ranging from 1.3% under the ‘soft’ 
Brexit scenario to 2.7% under the ‘hard’ Brexit scenario. Their analysis also suggests that other EU countries 
may lose out – especially those that trade intensively with the UK (e.g., Ireland) – but that some countries 
outside the EU may experience a small welfare gain because of a trade diversion effect. 
Ries et al. (2017) derive the implications of eight Brexit scenarios for the UK, EU27 and the US using 
a CGE model. The results suggest the WTO-rules Brexit is most costly for the UK: within ten years, the 
UK’s real GDP would be 4.9% lower than if the UK had remained within the EU. The EU27 Member 
States suffer also but less than the UK, with a fall in EU27 GDP of 0.7%. The US, on the other hand, may 
experience a modest gain of 0.02% of GDP, resulting from reduced trade diversion. Among all Brexit 
options, the three-way UK-EU27-US TTIP-style FTA is the least damaging for the UK, followed by the 
Norwegian model (second best), and a customs union for goods (third best). 
Ebell and Warren (2016) assume Brexit will affect the UK economy through three main channels: (a) 
reductions in trade with EU countries following a modest increase in tariff barriers; (b) reduction in FDI 
(in particular, services FDI); and (c) reduction in UK’s fiscal contribution to the EU. The authors model 
three Brexit scenarios: ‘Norway’, ‘Switzerland’ and ‘WTO’, all of which assume that the UK leaves the 
Customs Union, that rules of origin are applied to UK exports to the EU and that the UK loses access to 
EU’s free trade arrangements with third parties. Using the NiGEM model to derive the macroeconomic 
effects of the trade changes, they find that by 2030, GDP is projected to be between 1.5% and 3.7% lower 
compared to a baseline scenario where the UK remains in the EU. They also find that real wages and 
consumption are set to fall: real wages by between 2.2% and 6.3%, and consumption by between 2.4% and 
5.4%. These declines are expected to be more pronounced than the decline in GDP because of the 
permanent deterioration in the terms of trade, and shift towards savings. This projected fall in GDP equates 
to some 0.1% GDP reduction for each 1% reduction in trade. 
HM Treasury (2016) analyses the impact of leaving the EU on trade and FDI, and what this means for 
GDP and productivity under three scenarios: EEA membership, a negotiated bilateral trade agreement (like 
Canada) and trade on WTO terms (like Russia or Brazil). It finds that in the long term – over 15 years – 
there will be a loss of GDP ranging from 3.4% to 4.3% under the ‘EEA’ scenario, from 4.6% to 7.8% under 
the ‘negotiated bilateral agreement’ alternative, and from 5.4% to 9.5% under the ‘WTO’ alternative. 
Potential economic losses may be greater if the UK loses out on the benefits of wider EU economic reforms 
such as the implementation of the ‘Services Directive’, the Digital Single Market, single energy market, and 
the completion of ongoing trade negotiations with the US, Japan, India and with the ASEAN and Mercosur 
countries. More recent work by the HM Government (2018), which was widely leaked in the press, was 
based on CGE model and suggested aggregate welfare losses of a similar order of magnitude, ranging from 
-1.6% to -7.7% depending on the scenario. 
Comparing Brexit to a ‘tax on GDP’ that would impose a persistent and rising cost on the economy, 
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016), again on the basis of a CGE model, project that by 2020 GDP would be some 
3% smaller than if the UK had remained part of the EU. Over the long term, there will also be additional 
structural impacts working through the channels such as capital, immigration, lower technical progress and 
labour productivity being held back by lower FDI and a smaller pool of skilled workers, all of which are 
expected to result in considerably greater costs. By 2030, UK GDP may be some 5% lower under the 
‘central’ Brexit scenario. Around two-fifths of this derives from lower levels of productivity driven by lower 
trade openness. Even in the ‘optimistic’ Brexit scenario, GDP of the UK will fall 2.7% by 2030, while the 
‘pessimistic’ scenario may lead to 7.7% fall. 
Work commissioned by the Mayor of London from Cambridge Econometrics (2018) studies the effects 
of Brexit on the UK economy and produces a sub-regional forecast for key sectors in London. The forecasts 
distinguish between five different scenarios, ranging from status quo, a two year transition with membership 
of the Single Market or the Customs Union thereafter, to falling back to WTO terms. Compared to the 
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status quo, maintaining membership of the Single Market but not the Customs Union could lead to a loss 
of £18.6bn in GVA and 176,000 jobs across the UK by 2030. A ‘hard’ Brexit without a transition period 
could result in a loss of £54.4bn in GVA and 482,000 jobs across the UK. The report suggests that while 
some 87,000 jobs could be lost in London alone, the capital could suffer much less from Brexit than the 
rest of the country, increasing geographic inequalities across the UK. 
 
 
4. Model, Data and Calibration 
 
4.1. The Model 
 
Our analysis is based on a partial equilibrium model of the possible impact of Brexit on prices, exports, 
imports and output in 122 manufacturing industries, based on the 4-digit classes of ISIC Revision 4. The 
model has a multi-market structure, and in this application has four markets: the United Kingdom, the rest 
of the European Union (EU27), 67 countries with which the EU currently has Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA67) and a residual rest of the world (ROW). 
There are two variants of the model. The core model (referred to as ICF below) is based on Krugman’s 
(1979, 1980, 1981) model of trade under imperfect competition, and our partial equilibrium application 
builds on the work of Smith and Venables (1988). The model assumes each industry produces differentiated 
products under conditions of increasing returns to scale. Modelling of demand follows Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), with constant elasticity demand functions for individual products. This means consumers have a 
‘love of variety’ in any one product: wine drinkers like wine from different Spanish producers, and also wine 
from different Australian producers; and demand for an individual variety depends on its price relative to 
an aggregate product price index. Demand for the aggregate product is a function of the aggregate price 
index. The imperfect substitutability of different firms’ varieties gives rise to imperfect competition, in 
which firms have market power and set prices above marginal cost. Increasing returns mean that growth in 
a firm’s sales in one market reduces its cost of production and leads to expansion in other markets too. 
Markets are segmented and firms act as Bertrand competitors, setting prices in each market to maximise 
profits taking competitors’ prices as given. The number of firms in each country are constant. (A fuller 
description of the model is given in the appendix.) 
A second version of the model which we use for sensitivity analysis (referred to as ARM) applies the 
standard Armington assumption on the demand side (Armington, 1969). This means that products are 
differentiated only by place of production (consumers treat all Spanish wine as homogenous but different 
from all Australian wine), so that the product varieties produced in different countries are imperfect 
substitutes for each other. In this variant of the model, we assume perfect competition so individual firms 
do not have market power, and supply behaviour is described by a standard upward sloping supply function. 
Because we use partial equilibrium analysis, our results should not be seen as making ‘predictions’ about 
the precise sectoral effects of Brexit. The actual effects will depend in good part on the changes in policy 
which we model, but in addition on structural factors which are not captured by the model, on the second-
order adjustments in factor markets and markets for intermediates, on other policy changes and shocks 
which cannot be predicted, as well as on longer run changes in investment. Our modelling aims to provide 
a consistent framework for evaluating orders of magnitude of the direct effects on manufacturing from 
different possible scenarios. This enables comparison across industries and sectors and across scenarios of 
the extent to which the different industries and sectors are vulnerable to the changes in trade costs implied 





Our model requires data on production, bilateral trade flows and trade costs, where production and trade 
data are combined to capture domestic absorption (domestic consumption of domestic production). The 
model requires these data to be broken down by industry and by country (i.e., market). Data are collected 
for 2016. 
There is a fundamental difference between the two sets of data: production data are collected on an 
activity basis while trade data are collected on a commodity basis. The two can be partially (and imperfectly) 
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reconciled using concordance tables, but in sectors where the reconciliation was problematic, we used 
secondary sources of information on the share of production exported by each industry from the latest 
release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2015, Timmer et al., 2016) in order 
to adjust the underlying production data. 
 
Trade, Production and Trade Costs: Data on gross output for the UK and the EU came from the OECD 
Structural and Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS) database for which the latest available data were 
for 2015. These were then adjusted on the basis of the growth in each countries’ exports over the period 
2015-16, assuming a constant ratio of exports to production. 
We also need data for all other countries, aggregated to FTA67 and ROW. For these countries, 
production was estimated on the basis of the value of exports (for which more accurate data are available), 
together with information from WIOD on the ratio of exports to production in 2014.5 
The source of bilateral goods trade data used is the UN Comtrade database at the 6-digit level of the 
Harmonised System (HS). These data were then aggregated to the ISIC 4-digit level using concordance 
tables. To reduce the number of missing observations at the HS 6-digit subheading level and improve the 
accuracy of trade flows data, we averaged imports data and mirror flows based on partners’ exports data.6 
To account for the costs of trade between countries, we also need information on tariffs and non-tariff 
measures (NTMs). Bilateral tariff data were taken from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database, at the HS 6-digit 
level and then as with the trade data aggregated to the ISIC 4-digit level using concordance tables. We use 
the average effectively applied (AHS) tariff rates which take into account the tariffs applied between 
countries with preferential agreements be they bilateral in the case of free trade areas, or unilateral in the 
case of schemes such as the Generalised System of Preferences. In the absence of preferential treatment, 
the AHS rates are the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rates. In our analysis, we use import-weighted average 
tariff rates. Where 2016 data were missing, we used tariff data for earlier years.7 A similar approach was 
adopted by Caliendo and Parro (2015) in their study of the trade and welfare effects of NAFTA. 
Unlike tariffs, NTMs are not simple numbers – “they are complex legal texts that are not easily 
amenable to quantification, comparison, or even standard formatting” (Cadot et al., 2012). Because of the 
growing recognition of the importance of non-tariff barriers on trade flows, there has been increasing 
interests among trade economists and policymakers in their measurement (Berden and Francois, 2015). As 
with specific duties, this essentially amounts to calculating the ad-valorem equivalent of an NTM, which is 
the rate of a hypothetical tariff that would generate an equivalent reduction in imports. These estimates can 
then be fed into the partial equilibrium model to simulate the effect of trade policy changes involving 
NTMs. The econometric quantification of NTM equivalents for different countries and industries is 
complex, and there is considerable variation in estimates reported across different studies. 
In this paper, we make use of the NTM equivalents estimated by Cadot and Gourdon (2016), who 
compute these for sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and other technical barriers to trade for 21 sections 
of the HS classification using a direct price-gap estimation approach.8 We use these estimates partly because 
they are based on the most recent data; partly because, as Cadot and Gourdon (2016) note, their estimates 
lie within a single-digit range and are somewhat lower than previous estimates based on older data (which 
may reflect the progressive phasing out of instruments such as quantitative restrictions in many countries); 
and partly because as they are computed for all 21 sections of the HS classification, and can be linked with 
a fair degree of precision to our 122 manufacturing industries. A further advantage of the NTM estimates  
of Cadot and Gourdon (2016) is that they distinguish between the size of the NTM barriers between 
countries that are part of a regional trade agreement (RTA) and those that are not. This enables us to use 
their NTM equivalents in the presence of deep integration clauses in RTAs as a proxy for the NTM-related 
trade costs within the Single Market. For any other bilateral trade relationships, we use the ad-valorem 
equivalents of NTMs in the absence of an RTA. 
 
                                                     
5 The WIOD data are at a higher level of aggregation and cover 56 manufacturing sectors, which we then corresponded with our 122 sectors. 
6 In theory, the reported imports of country A from country B should match country B’s reported exports to country A, but in practice 
discrepancies exist. This is for several reasons. Firstly, imports are recorded as cif (cost insurance freight) and exports are recorded as fob (free on 
board), and this difference in recording may amount to some 10-20% difference in trade values. Secondly customs authorities typically have a 
greater obligation to accurately record import flows (for revenue purposes), in comparison to export flows. Thirdly, the export documentation 
may record the first destination of the flow, which in the case of transhipments may not be the same as the final destination. 
7 Based on the HS2012 classification. 
8 The price-gap estimation approach involves estimating the ad-valorem equivalent of an NTM by comparing directly the price of products in the 
NTM’s presence with that of similar products on markets without; it does not assume that NTMs reduce trade as quantity-based approaches 
would do. The price-gap approach relies on the availability of and comparability of price data. 
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Model Parameters: Elasticities: The model also requires estimates of the elasticity of substitution 
between different varieties of the same product, the elasticity of demand for each product in aggregate and 
the elasticity of supply. Empirical evidence on such elasticities is somewhat limited. Hertel et al. (2007) 
described the history of estimating the substitution elasticities governing trade flows in the CGE models as 
being “checkered at best”. 
Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate elasticities of substitution among goods at various levels of 
aggregation and different time periods. Their results show that as product categories become more 
disaggregated, goods become increasingly substitutable. For an earlier period (1972-1988), the simple 
average substitution elasticity is 17 for 7-digit TSUSA goods, but only 7 for 3-digit goods. They also show 
that the mean (and median) elasticity has fallen over time (to 12 for 10-digit HTS goods and 4 for 3-digit 
goods for 1990-2001), suggesting that goods have become more differentiated. Broda and Weinstein (2006) 
also demonstrate that more homogenous (less differentiated) goods are more substitutable. In our work, 
we categorise our 122 4-digit ISIC Rev.4 classes as either homogenous or differentiated. For homogenous 
goods industries, we set the value of substitution elasticity at 6. For differentiated-goods industries, we set 
the value of substitution elasticity at 3. These values tie in with a simple average substitution elasticity of 4 
for 3-digit HTS goods for 1990-2001 in Broda and Weinstein (2006). 
A recent attempt at estimating import demand elasticities is the work of Ghodsi et al. (2016b), who 
compute importer-specific import demand elasticities for 167 countries and 5,124 commodities at the 6-
digit level of the HS1996, for the period 1996-2014. Across all HS 6-digit products and countries, they find 
a mean value of import demand elasticity of -1.20, with significant variation across countries and across 
products. In our analysis, we use import demand elasticities of Ghodsi et al. (2016), aggregated to the level 
of our 122 industries. 
In the baseline version of the imperfect competition version of the model, we assume increasing returns 
to scale with an arbitrarily chosen elasticity of 0.1. For the Armington version of our model, we also need 
to specify supply elasticities. Although some partial equilibrium models adopt the simplification that supply 
elasticities are infinite (Hallren and Riker, 2017) this will depend on the characteristics of the industry in 
question. We assume a high but finite supply elasticity, with a value set at 6 for domestic suppliers to 
domestic market (i.e., UK supplier to UK market, EU27 suppliers to EU27 market, etc.) and at 15 for other 
suppliers. (All the elasticities used in this paper are reported in the Appendix Table 15.) 
 
 
5. Scenarios and Results 
 
We model the impact of Brexit on 122 manufacturing industries under five different possible Brexit scenarios. These range 
from EEA membership, which most resembles the status quo and is our ‘softest’ Brexit scenario; to the ‘hard’ No Trade 
Deals scenario, where the UK reverts to trading on WTO terms with all countries. Table 2 provides a summary of 
the key features of each. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of five Brexit scenarios 
 
 
Scenario 1: EEA This is our ‘softest’ Brexit scenario, where we assume that the UK leaves the EU 
CU, but signs an FTA with the EU, has full membership of the Single Market, and grandfathers the 67 
existing EU FTAs. Leaving the CU would entail increased border inspections to check whether goods 
imported into the EU from the UK are UK goods covered by the FTA or non-UK goods which may be 
subject to EU tariffs. Based on Centre for Economic Policy Research (2013), Francois et al. (2013), 
Carrère and de Melo (2015), Anson et al. (2005), Cadot et al. (2005) and Hayakawa (2011), we have assumed 
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border inspections would increase trade costs between the UK and the EU by 3.5% (this is at the lower end of 
the estimates in the literature). All other trade costs between the UK and other countries, including the EU, are 
unchanged. This increase in trade costs between the UK and EU is then included in all subsequent experiments. 
 
Scenario 2: FTA with EU and FTA67 The UK is again assumed to leave the CU, and in addition 
leaves the Single Market. However, it signs an FTA with the EU, and bilateral tariffs with the EU remain 
at zero. Leaving the Single Market increases the non-tariff related cost of EU-UK trade, however, because 
of the need for conformity assessments. We model this by assuming that non-tariff barriers increase. We 
use the lower FTA-inclusive NTM estimates of Cadot and Gourdon (2016).9 As before, we assume that 
the costs of trade between the UK and non-EU countries do not change. 
 
Scenario 3: No Trade Deals In this scenario, we assume that there is no trade agreement between the 
UK and the EU and no rolling over of the EU’s FTAs to the UK, so the UK trades on WTO terms with 
all countries. The UK, EU, and EU FTA countries (FTA67) apply MFN tariffs on bilateral trade with the 
UK. The UK is assumed to adopt the current EU28 tariff schedules. Because the WTO has made less 
progress than the EU in reducing non-tariff barriers (Dhingra et al., 2016) and in liberalising trade in services 
(Borchert, 2016; Dhingra and Sampson, 2016), there would also be an increase in non-tariff barriers 
between the UK and the EU which we assume can be represented by the higher non-FTA Cadot and 
Gourdon (2016)  estimates. 
 
Scenario 4: FTA with FTA67 and ROW The preceding three scenarios model successive reductions 
in the UK’s access to EU and EU-FTA countries. Here, we assess the extent to which the impact of 
reductions in access to the EU market could be offset by the UK signing free trade agreements with third 
countries. We therefore assume no UK-EU trade deal, but also that the UK signs FTAs with all non-EU 
countries. This involves rolling over the existing EU FTAs and agreeing new FTAs with all other countries 
with which the EU does not currently have agreements. This is a very generous modelling of the potential 
of the UK to make new trade deals. As the data show that existing EU FTAs do not reduce duties on all 
tariff lines to zero, we model this scenario as a reduction in UK tariffs on imports from the rest of the 
world (ROW) to the level currently applied on imports from the EU-FTA countries, and a reduction in the 
ROW tariff on imports from the UK to the level applied by the FTA countries. These new global trade 
deals are also assumed to imply a reduction in NTMs. 
 
Scenario 5: Unilateral Free Trade This is effectively a version of the No Trade Deals scenario in that 
the UK leaves the EU with no trade deal, fails to roll over existing EU FTAs and fails to agree new trade 
deals. The UK, however, chooses to unilaterally remove tariffs on all imports, while other countries do not 
reciprocate. UK tariffs on imports fall to zero, but UK exports are subject to MFN tariffs. In this scenario, 
in the spirit of unilateral free trade, we also assume the UK will treat imports from most countries as 
acceptable from a regulatory perspective, which we model by assuming NTMs on imports into the UK 
from all countries are set at the lower level that apply to trade flows between countries that have FTAs and 
that therefore recognise each other’s regulatory regimes. We also assume all trade flows to and from the 
UK face border costs of 3.5%. Even if there are no tariffs to be collected on imports, border controls will 
be needed to ensure regulatory and legal requirements are met. With the UK out of the EU, border controls 
will be required to collect VAT on imports too, and there would be border inspections of imports from the 
EU as well as from the rest of the world. 
 
Table 3 details the assumptions made about the changes in trade costs across the different scenarios. 
The top panel gives the situation in the base. Each of the subsequent panels only has an entry if there is 
any change from the base. So if you take the EEA panel, the only change from the base is in border costs. 
In the second experiment, once again we have the change in border costs but in addition there is an increase 
in NTMs. 
 
                                                     
9 In practice, membership of the Single Market lowers the costs associated with NTMs, but does not eliminate them. In our modelling of Brexit, 
however, we adopt a simplifying assumption that the Single Market keeps costs of NTMs at zero, while an EU-UK FTA is assumed to have low 
NTMs and trade in the absence of an FTA, conducted on WTO rules, has high NTMs. The estimates of low and high NTMs are based on what 
Cadot and Gourdon (2016) define as NTM level with and without an RTA, respectively. See Cadot and Gourdon (2016) for further details. 
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Table 3: Trade costs assumptions in five Brexit scenarios 
 
Notes: AHS: effectively applied tariff rate, which allows for preferential agreements. MFN: Most Favoured Nation 
tariff rate. Low and High NTMs refer to estimates of average NTMs with and without RTAs, respectively; these 
estimates for 21 HS Sections are sourced from Cadot and Gourdon (2016). In Brexit scenarios 1-4, the deviations 
from base trade costs are bi-directional (i.e., apply to the UK and the relevant partner country). In the Unilateral Free 
Trade scenario, however, what we report as deviations from base apply to the UK imports. The UK exports in the 
Unilateral Free Trade scenario are subject to the MFN tariffs, high NTMs and 3.5% border costs in all three markets 
(EU, FTA67, ROW). 
 
 
5.1. Average Impact 
 
Before looking at how Brexit might affect individual manufacturing industries, we first set out the ‘average’ 
impact of Brexit across all industries for each of the scenarios, showing the effects on prices, exports, 
imports and output. Figure 1 shows that as we step through Scenarios 1, 2 and 3, from ‘softer’ to ‘harder’ 
versions of Brexit, the negative impacts on UK manufacturing increase in more or less equal steps. For 
instance, the aggregate decline in output goes from -2.1%, to -4.0% to -5.5%. The improbable achievement 
of FTAs with every single country outside the EU (Scenario 4) would only partially mitigate the effects of 
having no FTA with the EU, leading to an output decline of -3.6%. Unilateral Free Trade (Scenario 5) has 
the biggest impact on UK output, leading to a 12.2% decline. This is driven by the substantial decline in 
the UK exports, which are subject to the MFN tariffs of other countries; and substitution away from 
domestically produced goods towards imports, which with the removal of tariffs become relatively cheaper. 
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Figure 1: How different manufacturing scenarios will impact on prices, exports, imports and 
output in the manufacturing sector 
 
 
These aggregate impacts are the sum of the effects on each of the 122 individual industries. How each 
industry adjusts to the changes in tariffs and NTMs arising from the different scenarios depends on several 
factors: first, results will be driven by the size of the experiment (changes in trade costs) in each industry; 
second, impacts will depend on the underlying structure of UK trade (industries where a high proportion 
of output is exported, and where a high proportion of exports are destined for the EU will see a bigger 
impact on exports as a result of any change in bilateral trade costs); and third, the underlying parameters of 
the model and notably the elasticities of both supply and demand will impact on the results. 
To understand these drivers, we have run a stylised set of regressions on the outcome variables of 
interest – output, prices, exports and imports – in scenarios 1-3 of the imperfect competition version of 
the model.10 The regressions are normalised such that the beta coefficients are the regression coefficients 
obtained by first standardising all variables as z-scores to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
Hence, the coefficients refer to how many standard deviations a dependent variable will change in response 
to one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of Brexit on manufacturing sectors: regression results 
 
Notes: Table reports results from normalised regressions, which use z-scores as LHS and RHS variables. The 
dependent variable is the z-score of the simulated percentage change in prices / output / exports / imports for 
individual 122 manufacturing industries. Standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** = 1% 
                                                     
10 We include only these three scenarios as they focus on Brexit scenarios where trade with the EU and other countries becomes more restrictive. 
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significance level; ** = 5% significance level and * = 10% significance level. ICF: imperfect competition partial 
equilibrium model with decreasing marginal costs. 
 
In the first panel of Table 4, we consider the size of the experiment and find that increases in tariff and 
non-tariff costs impact on prices, trade and output. On average, the impact of changes in non-tariff costs 
is greater than the impact of changes in tariffs and this is true across all the outcome measures, simply 
because the changes in non-tariff barriers are larger. 
The middle panel of the table identifies core structural features of the data which impact on the results 
and where we identify the role of: 
• UK share of UK market: the share of total demand in the UK for a given good which is met 
by UK production. 
• EU share of UK market: the share of total demand in the UK for a given good which is met 
by imports from the EU27. 
• UK share of UK sales: the share of total UK production of a given good which is sold 
domestically. 
• EU share of UK sales: the share of total UK production of a given good which is exported to 
the EU27. 
Consider first the impact on prices. Predictably, the higher the EU share in the UK market the bigger 
the price rise. 
Turning to exports, the most important structural feature is the EU share of UK sales: rising trade costs 
have a more negative effect on exports where the EU share in UK sales is higher. Similarly, the higher the 
EU share of the UK market the bigger the negative impact of increasing trade costs on imports. We also 
see that the higher is the UK share of the UK market the bigger is the decline in imports: if the UK share 
of the UK market is high, it is easier to switch to UK suppliers. 
Changes in imports and exports then drive the changes in output through three main channels: (a) 
domestic protection may enable domestic producers to expand output; (b) domestic protection raises prices 
so lowers demand so may reduce output; and (c) raising the tariff or NTM costs of exporting to the EU 
reduces UK exports and hence sales. On average, we see that the higher the share of total UK production 
which is sold in the UK the bigger the increase in UK production: effect (a) dominates (b) and (c). There 
is a similar effect from the EU share of the UK market. Protection makes EU suppliers less attractive and 
the more they sell to the UK initially the bigger this effect will be. 
In the bottom panel, we consider the role of key demand parameters. The elasticities of demand are 
only significant for exports and imports, where as expected the higher is the elasticity of demand the larger 
is the negative impact on trade flows. The elasticity of substitution plays a more important role for all 
outcome variables. The higher the elasticity, the easier it is for consumers to switch between products from 
different sources, and the larger therefore are the impacts on trade, prices and output. 
 
 
5.2. Impact on Different Industries 
 
The average results mask significant variation in how Brexit may affect different manufacturing industries. 
Here, we discuss the distribution of the changes in prices, exports, imports and output for three of our 
Brexit scenarios: the softest EEA (Scenario 1), No Trade Deals (Scenario 3) and Unilateral Free Trade 
(Scenario 5). This discussion highlights the wide variation in the results and also the differences across the 
three experiments. 
 
Distribution of Changes: There is considerable variation across industries in the impact of Scenario 3 
(No Trade Deals) on UK prices, with increases ranging from close to zero to 15%. The median industry 
experiences an increase in prices equal to 4.3%, and for five industries, prices rise by more than 10%. The 
distribution of price changes is broadly similar for Scenario 1 (EEA), but the magnitude of these changes 
is smaller. 
Although the Unilateral Free Trade scenario reduces all tariffs on imports (which serves to reduce 
prices), it also involves an increase in border costs between the UK and the EU, and an increase in NTMs. 
Additionally, as firms produce under conditions of increasing returns to scale, the reduction in output by 
UK firms from reduced protection causes some increase in costs and hence prices. The net effect is 
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therefore that for most industries prices rise, with a price reduction for some ten industries. This decline in 
prices is in most cases small (between 0% and 3%), except for sugar where it is 14%. This is because sugar 
has an extremely high ad-valorem tariff of 74%. 
Turning to trade flows, all three scenarios lead to export declines for all industries, with the effects being 
strongest for Scenario 5 (Unilateral Free Trade) and weakest for Scenario 1 (EEA). For most industries, 
imports are also expected to fall after Brexit, with some industries (such as dairy products) experiencing a 
decline in import value of almost 90% in Scenario 3 (No Trade Deals). There are 17 industries that see 
imports grow under the No Trade Deals scenario, but these rises in imports are projected to be relatively 
modest (less than 2%). This requires some explanation. In the No Trade Deals scenario trade costs between 
the UK, the EU, and the EU-FTA countries rise, which would suggest a decline in imports. However, it 
also implies a decline in exports. Where exports are a significant share of production, the decline in exports 
leads to a decline in output and a corresponding increase in prices as firms move up their average costs 
curves. This reduces the competitiveness of UK firms domestically and can lead to a net rise in imports. 
Finally, we turn to changes in output for individual industries. Unlike prices (which are largely projected 
to increase) and trade (largely projected to fall), there is a more mixed picture for output changes. This is 
because, as discussed earlier, there are three channels through which changes in imports and exports impact 
on output. In Scenario 1 (EEA) and Scenario 3 (No Trade Deals) output is projected to fall for some two-
thirds of the industries but to increase for the rest. The Unilateral Free Trade scenario is more likely than 
other Brexit scenarios to lead to output declines, with the worst affected industry (sugar) projected to see a 
close to 90% drop in output (and an output decline of 11% for the median industry). By comparison, the 
industry which has the largest negative impact under the EEA and No Trade Deals scenarios (fibre optic 
cables) is projected to see output decline by 19% and 52%, respectively. 
 
Most and Least Affected Industries: We have seen a relatively wide distribution of impacts across the 
122 manufacturing industries. Tables 5-7 show the ten industries with the largest increases and decreases in 
output across three of our scenarios: EEA, No Trade Deals and the Unilateral Free Trade. For these 
industries, we report the percentage change in output, trade (exports and imports) and the percentage 
change in prices. As a comparison, we also report the respective changes for the median industry. 
As discussed earlier, the impacts on the most and the least vulnerable manufacturing industries are 
driven primarily by the structure of existing trade flows and level of trade barriers. In the EEA scenario, 
given our assumption that all industries are affected uniformly by the higher border inspection cost of 3.5%, 
it is the underlying structure of trade which matters most. For example, in the industry with the largest 
increase in output (sawmilling and planing of wood), 93% of UK output is sold domestically, only 5% of 
UK output is exported to the EU, and UK producers account for 34% of total domestic sales. Conversely, 
in the industry that sees the biggest decline at nearly 20% (fibre optic cables), less than 4% of UK output is 
sold domestically, 46% of UK output is exported to the EU, and the EU supplies 55% of UK sales. 
In both the No Trade Deals and the Unilateral Free Trade scenarios there are differential changes in 
trade costs (tariffs and NTMs) across industries. For example in the Unilateral Free Trade experiment the 
industry which declines the most is sugar, which does not appear in the list of top 10 most affected 
industries for either of the other experiments. The explanation is that the high level of protection afforded 
to sugar, which has an average ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) import-weighted EU MFN tariff of 74%, and 
non-tariff AVE of 17%, is being reduced in this scenario. 
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Table 5: EEA: top ten – bottom ten industries 
 
 





Table 7: Unilateral Free Trade: top ten – bottom ten industries 
 
 
Several of the industries with largest output increases are in food processing. These industries tend to 
have high levels of protection (both tariffs and NTMs) and a higher share of imports from EU than non-
EU countries (and often a significant share of demand met by domestic producers). Erecting relatively high 
barriers on imports from the EU (as in No Trade Deals scenario) may stimulate some additional domestic 
production to serve domestic markets, while unilaterally removing all tariffs on imports (as in Unilateral 
Free Trade scenario) will not add much extra competition as non-EU imports are relatively small. 
By contrast, many industries in textiles and clothing have the largest projected decreases in output. In 
‘wearing apparel’ less than 2% of UK demand is met by domestic producers and close to 70% of demand 
by non-EU producers. Because tariffs are relatively high, domestic producers are vulnerable to increased 
competition from non-EU producers following removal of tariffs under the Unilateral Free Trade scenario. 
In addition, a sizeable proportion of exports is destined for the EU (71%) and a much smaller share (7%) 
is sold in the UK, so domestic producers are vulnerable under the EEA and the No Trade Deals scenarios. 
Considering the extremes of the distribution offers only part of the story. Table 8 gives the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients across the three experiments reported above for prices, trade and output. 
These coefficients indicate whether the vulnerability of different manufacturing industries in one Brexit 
scenario makes them similarly vulnerable to another Brexit scenario. The correlations are strongest between 
the EEA and the No Trade Deals scenarios, and reflect the similarity in vulnerability across the scenarios. 
 




5.3. Impact on Different Sectors 
 
We now aggregate our 122 industries into sectors to give a broader picture of how UK manufacturing may 
be affected. The cells in the tables in this section of the paper contain colour-coded data bars, where blue 
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bars capture negative changes and yellow bars capture positive changes. 
 
Impact on Broader Sectoral Groupings: Here, we aggregate the results for individual industries into 11 
broad sectors.11 Table 9 shows that across the scenarios the biggest increase in prices is for Transport, and 
for Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals. The one sector where prices decrease is Textiles, Apparel and Footwear 
– and only where the UK chooses to unilaterally remove all tariffs (Scenario 5). The smallest impact on 
prices is for Wood, Paper and Printing. 
 
Table 9: Sectoral groups and Brexit: impact on prices 
 
 
Table 10 suggests Food Processing is most at risk of a significant fall in exports after Brexit. This decline 
is 38% under Scenario 3 (No Trade Deals) and 41% under Scenario 5 (Unilateral Free Trade). As with 
exports, Table 11 shows that Food Processing may see the biggest declines in imports, ranging from 3% in 
the Unilateral Free Trade scenario to 46% in the No Trade Deals scenario. Overall, these larger declines in 
exports and imports for Food Processing are driven in good part by the size of tariff and NTMs in this 
sector, coupled with the extent of trade with the EU. 
 
Table 10: Sectoral groups and Brexit: impact on exports 
 
 
Table 11: Sectoral groups and Brexit: impact on imports 
 
 
                                                     
11 These are somewhat broader than the 2-digit divisions of ISIC Rev.4. The appendix provides full details. 
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Finally, Table 12 shows that for most sectors output falls under all scenarios, most notably for Textiles, 
Apparel and Footwear. In contrast, Food Processing, and Wood, Paper and Printing experience output 
growth, though not in all scenarios. Under Unilateral Free Trade, Food Processing output declines by 8%. 
The impact of trade liberalisation on some sectoral groups should not be taken as an argument for 
protection (which comes at the expense of consumers and intermediate goods purchasers who face higher 
prices), and it is important to recognise that should the UK unilaterally remove all tariffs, domestic 
producers in some industries may suffer very heavily when exposed to import competition from foreign 
producers. 
 
Table 12: Sectoral groups and Brexit: impact on output 
 
 
It is also worth noting that if instead of aggregating results for 122 industries into 11 broad sectors, we 
aggregate data first and run simulations for 11 sectors, we get some differences in the final results.12 
Aggregation makes a difference to the analysis: the aggregated results conducted at a disaggregated level 
can be significantly different from the results of the same analysis done at the aggregated level. And with 
most policy being made and applied at a very detailed level, this emphasises the importance of detailed 
analyses at disaggregated levels to better understand the effects of policy changes. 
 
R&D Intensity: R&D-intensive sectors are often considered to be important drivers of economic growth, 
and the UK Government’s industrial strategy places an emphasis on building a knowledge and innovation-
led economy through R&D investment (Clark, 2017). Understanding how Brexit may affect high R&D 
sectors relative to low R&D sectors may shed light on possible longer-term implications of Brexit, as 
changes to R&D-intensive sectors in trade and output will have consequential effects on investment and 
training. Using an OECD taxonomy,13 we aggregate the 122 manufacturing industries into four groups 
depending on the R&D intensity of their main production activities (high, medium-high, medium and 
medium-low R&D intensity).14 
The impacts on output, shown in Table 13, depend on the net effects of the import and export changes. 
The medium-low R&D group sees the biggest declines in imports as protection of domestic industries rises. 
It also experiences a decline in exports, but because the share of sales going to the UK is high the net impact 
on output is small and in two of the scenarios positive. Conversely, the more R&D-intensive group shows 
output declining in all scenarios, with the biggest drop in output expected for the medium-high R&D group, 
followed by the high R&D group. This reflects the high proportion of their sales, which goes to the EU. 
The fact that high and medium-high R&D industries are more at risk of a significant decline in domestic 
production than medium and medium-low R&D industries has implications for the UK Government’s 
ambition to support economic growth and drive productivity through R&D and innovation. 
 
                                                     
12 The latter results are not reported here, but available from the authors on request. 
13 The OECD taxonomy links 3-digit groups of ISIC Rev.4 to different R&D-intensity groups, and is available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-taxonomy-of-economic-activities-based-on-r-d-intensity_5jlv73sqqp8r-en. 
14 Full detail on this aggregation is in the appendix. The OECD taxonomy also defines low R&D sectors, but none of the manufacturing 
industries is classed as low R&D intensity in the OECD taxonomy. 
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6. Impact on Places and Workers 
 
The projected changes in output, trade and prices, will have implications on consumers, producers and 
workers across the country. Previous studies which have analysed the impact of Brexit on consumer prices 
and households include Clarke et al. (2017) for the UK and Lawless and Morgenroth (2018) for the Republic 
of Ireland. In this section, we focus on the labour market implications of Brexit, and examine how changes 




6.1. Locational Impact of Brexit 
 
To assess locational impact, we assume that employment effects are proportional to output changes (i.e., a 
5% reduction in output results in a 5% reduction in employment), and combine this with data on the 
regional distribution of employment in different manufacturing industries. This enables us to translate our 
projections of the output effects of different scenarios into employment effects for different parts of the 
country. The results for the No Trade Deals scenario are shown in Figure 2 where we map the possible 
impacts in proportion to the size of the economically active population in each area. The areas are defined 
by local authority districts.  
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Figure 2: Impact of No Trade Deals Brexit on manufacturing employment across Local Authority 
Districts 
 
Source: Authors’ own analysis; Business Register and Employment Survey, 2016; Annual Population 
Survey, 2016; Ordnance Survey Boundary-Line. 
 
Most areas are expected to experience a manufacturing employment loss. Copeland is predicted to be 
the most negatively impacted with more than 10,000 jobs lost for every 100,000 economically active 
residents (see: Table 14). This arises partly because Copeland’s small pool of workers is concentrated in 
manufacturing (nuclear fuel processing), and partly because in our data nuclear processing is aggregated 
with a number of other non-ferrous metal activities, some of which experience big Brexit-related shocks. 
Other areas at risk of a substantial decline in manufacturing employment include Fylde (where employment 
is concentrated in the manufacturing of aircraft), Stratford-on-Avon (manufacturing of motor vehicles) and 
Leicester (manufacturing of wearing apparel). This reflects these areas’ higher reliance on jobs in sectors 
that see bigger impacts from Brexit. 
One in six areas may see employment growth. Among these, South Holland, Corby and Ryedale have 
the biggest projected positive effects from Brexit on employment in manufacturing. Our modelling suggests 
that the No Trade Deals version could add more than 1,000 manufacturing jobs for every 100,000 
economically active residents in these areas. This reflects their higher reliance on jobs in sectors, notably 
food processing, that see bigger positive impacts from protection given by higher trade costs with the EU. 
In Table 14 we also compare the employment vulnerability of different areas under the No Trade Deals 
and the EEA scenarios, identifying the ten districts with the largest increase in employment and the ten 
districts with the largest decrease, as well as the median outcome. 
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Table 14: Impact of No Trade Deals and EEA Brexit scenarios on manufacturing employment: 
top ten and bottom ten local authority districts 
 
 
As noted earlier, in the EEA scenario it is the structure of trade and production that drives the 
differential sectoral outcomes, because all industries are affected uniformly by higher border inspection 
costs of 3.5% and there are no differential tariff or NTM changes. That underlying structure is significant 
for all the experiments, as reflected in the Spearman rank correlation coefficients reported in Table 8. 
Hence, industries most vulnerable under the EEA scenario are also most vulnerable under the No Trade 
Deals scenario. This explains why there is considerable overlap in the local authority districts which see the 
largest and smallest employment changes. Eight of the local authorities which see the biggest increase in 
employment under a No Trade Deal, are also those with the biggest employment increase under the EEA 
scenario. Similarly with regard to the largest decreases in employment, there are eight local authority districts 
which overlap.  We see that Copeland ranks first for employment decreases under both scenarios; as does 
South Holland for employment increases. 
Of course, it is the magnitude of those expected employment changes that is different between the 
scenarios. The ‘hardest’ No Trade Deals Brexit may cause a 10,000 employment loss per 100,000 
economically active residents in Copeland – but under the ‘softest’ EEA Brexit the employment loss may 
be more like 2,400. The areas that might gain most employment under No Trade Deals may see more 
modest gains under the EEA scenario: for example, South Holland may gain close to 1,600 jobs for every 
100,000 economically active residents under the ‘hard’ Brexit but only some 200 jobs under the ‘soft’ Brexit. 
The median local authority district loses 199 jobs per 100,000 economically active residents under No Trade 
Deals – and loses 80 jobs under the EEA scenario. We reiterate that our local employment effects concern solely 
manufacturing employment, and do not reflect the full potential effect of Brexit on employment. The full effects are likely 
to be bigger arising from any changes in access in services.15 
 
 
                                                     
15 Analysing the pattern of UK regional services exports, Borchert and Tamberi (2018) find that regions such as the North East or the Midlands 
may potentially be more vulnerable to Brexit shocks because of the sectoral composition of their services exporters and their orientation towards 
EU markets. Chen et al. (2018), who constructed index for the regional GDP exposure to Brexit, find that it is many of the UK’s economically 
weaker regions which are especially exposed to Brexit, with GDP exposure to Brexit being highest in the Midlands and the North of England. 
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6.2. Employment effects of Brexit 
 
The variation in the possible impact on different manufacturing industries has wider labour market 
implications. In this section, we distinguish between high, medium, and low-skilled workers, and consider 
how the No Trade Deals and EEA scenarios might affect demand for different categories of workers. This 
is a static exercise, where the skills profile of different industries is taken as given and where we make no 
allowance for effects on labour supply decisions of workers, on training by firms, or on migration into the 
UK. 
We use the information on number of workers by skill type and by industry class in main job from the 
Labour Force Survey quarterly data for April-June 2016.16 We take the highest qualification of adults of 
working-age (HIQUL15D) as a proxy for skills, and in separating employed working-age adults into those 
with high, medium and low skills we adopted the following categorisation:17  
• High skills: those with higher and further education 
• Medium skills: those with A-levels, GCSE A*-C 
• Low skills: those with no qualifications 
Using the output ‘predictions’ from No Trade Deals and EEA scenarios, we calculate how demand for 
these different categories of workers will change. We assume an industry shock applied uniformly across 
three categories of workers. For instance, if No Trade Deals Brexit leads to a 10% decline in output in the 
motor vehicle sector, we assume there will be a corresponding 10% reduction in demand for high-skilled / 
medium-skilled / low-skilled workers employed in the motor vehicle sector. Any differences in the impact 
of Brexit on demand for different categories of workers will therefore stem from (a) differential impact on 
different sectors (for example, Brexit will lead to a larger output fall in basic chemicals sector than in 
pharmaceuticals), and (b) differences in the skills profile of workers in these sectors (the workforce in basic 
chemicals sector is on average less highly skilled than in pharmaceuticals, with 36% of workers being classed 
as high skilled compared to 69% in pharmaceuticals). 
Figure 3 shows the change in demand for high, medium and low-skilled workers across 11 regions of 
Britain for the No Trade Deals Brexit scenario; the changes in labour demand at the national level are also 
reported. Across most regions, the reduction in labour demand is more pronounced for high-skilled 
workers than for medium and low-skilled workers. The North East and the West Midlands are the only 
exceptions, where it is demand for medium-skilled workers that sees the largest reduction. While a No 
Trade Deals Brexit is expected to reduce demand for high and medium-skilled workers across all parts of 
the country, demand for low-skilled labour increases in six out of the 11 regions, with this growth being 
strongest in Yorkshire and the Humber. Growth in demand for low-skilled labour is highest in Yorkshire 
and the Humber because this region contains a higher proportion of sectors that may grow after Brexit, 
and those sectors tend to be intensive in low-skilled labour (most notably, food processing). 
 
                                                     
16 We accessed the LFS data using nesstar, an online analysis tool of the UK Data Service, where relevant weights have been applied. 
17 Those respondents who answered ‘Don’t Know’ (7) (HIQUL15D), did not answer the question (-8) or those to whom the question was ‘Not 
Applicable’ (-9) were excluded from the cross-tabulations. 
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Figure 3: Demand for skills after Brexit across British regions: No Trade Deals Brexit scenario 
Source: Authors’ own analysis using Business Register and Employment Survey 2016; Annual Population 
Survey, 2016; Labour Force Survey April-June 2016. 
 
We repeated the exercise for the EEA Brexit scenario, with results shown in Figure 4. In contrast to 
the No Trade Deals scenario, which may benefit low-skilled workers in some regions, all worker types in 
all parts of the country face reduced demand under the EEA scenario. As in the No Trade Deals, high and 
medium-skilled workers are more negatively affected than the low-skilled, but the reduction in demand for 
the former categories of workers is less pronounced under the EEA Brexit. The largest reduction in demand 
is for medium-skilled workers in the North East and the West Midlands. In London, changes in demand 
for high, medium and low-skilled workers are least pronounced, because compared to other regions a 
smaller proportion of the London’s economy is in manufacturing. 
 
Figure 4: Demand for skills after Brexit across British regions: EEA Brexit scenario 
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Source: Authors’ own analysis using Business Register and Employment Survey 2016; Annual Population 
Survey, 2016; Labour Force Survey April-June 2016. 
 
It is important to underline that the estimated change in demand for the three categories of workers 
(which we normalise by the size of the economically active population) is derived entirely from the simulated 
impact of Brexit on manufacturing, which is only 10% of the national economy. 
 
 
7. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
To check how robust the results were to modelling assumptions, we ran a set of simulations where we halved the elasticity 
of substitution and elasticity of demand. We also examined how the simulation results differed between different versions 
of the partial equilibrium model: the imperfect competition (ICF) model with decreasing marginal costs (i.e., the workhorse 
model), the imperfect competition model with constant marginal costs, and the ‘standard’ Armington (ARM) model. For 
these modelling alternatives, we set out the ‘average’ impact of No Trade Deals across all 122 manufacturing industries. 
 
Figure 5: How sensitive are the results to the modelling assumptions? 
Notes: ICF: imperfect competition partial equilibrium model. ARM: Armington model. MC: marginal costs. 
SE-half: simulations with substitution elasticity halved. DE-half: simulations with demand elasticity halved. 
 
Figure 5 shows the impact on prices is robust to the underlying modelling assumptions, with the average 
impact ranging from 4.9 to 5.6% increase in the No Trade Deals scenario. The impact on trade varies 
somewhat more depending on the assumed parameter values: because the substitution elasticity capturing 
the ease with which consumers are able to switch between products from different sources, the effect on 
exports and to a lesser degree on imports is somewhat sensitive to the substitution elasticity, because it 
captures the ease with which consumers can switch between products from different sources. Changing the 
demand elasticity, on the other hand, changes the effect on imports but makes little difference to exports. 





In this paper, we have outlined some of the possible implications of the UK’s exit from the EU on 122 
different manufacturing industries, as well as for broader sectoral aggregations. Using a partial equilibrium 
multi-market simulation model with an imperfectly competitive market structure, we have looked at how 
Brexit may impact on prices, exports, imports, and output in each of the manufacturing industries, and for 
different sector types. 
None of the five Brexit scenarios that we model leads to a positive outcome for UK manufacturing on 
average: even EEA membership results in higher costs of trade between the UK and the EU, and in reduced 
market access compared with full membership of the EU. These higher costs will harm UK manufacturing. 
Of the five Brexit scenarios we considered, Unilateral Free Trade has the biggest negative impact on 
UK manufacturing output because of the substantial decline in UK exports, which are subject to MFN 
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tariffs in other countries; and because of substitution away from domestically produced goods towards 
imports, which become relatively cheaper with the removal of UK tariffs. 
The results show that there is a considerable variation in how different manufacturing industries will 
be affected by Brexit. This differential impact of Brexit on manufacturing industries is driven primarily by 
the size of the changes in trade costs in different industries and the extent to which the industry depends 
on the EU market. 
The variation in how different manufacturing industries will be affected by Brexit also generates 
considerable differences in the impact of Brexit on different geographical areas and different categories of 
workers. These differences, coupled with the fact that most trade policy is made and applied at a very 
detailed level, highlight the importance of detailed disaggregated analysis for understanding the effects of 
Brexit on different industries and different UK regions. 
An important conclusion is that high tech and medium-high tech sectors are more at risk from Brexit 
than are medium and medium-low tech sectors. Brexit may lead to expansion in some sectors (especially in 
food processing), but the effects are small and come at the expense of higher consumer and intermediate 
goods prices. 
That high and medium-high tech sectors are more vulnerable to Brexit explains why across most regions 
the reduction in demand may be more pronounced for high-skilled workers than for medium and low-
skilled workers. Specifically, Brexit seems likely to reduce demand for high and medium-skilled workers in 
all parts of the country, while in some regions demand for low-skilled workers may increase under the No 
Trade Deals scenario. 
Lastly, we have looked at whether signing new trade deals can compensate for the loss of market access 
and trade with the EU. Our modelling of a scenario in which the UK leaves the EU without a deal but signs 
FTAs with all other countries in the world suggests that even these universal FTAs would not fully mitigate 
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A  Appendix figures and tables 
 
Table 15: Categorisation of 122 manufacturing industries 
Manufacturing industry (4-digit class of ISIC Rev.4) Sectoral 
group 




1.  1010 Processing/preserving of meat FOOD ML 6 1.001 
2. 1020 Processing/preserving of fish, etc. FOOD ML 6 0.960 
3. 1030 Processing/preserving of fruit, vegetables FOOD ML 6 0.965 
4. 1040 Vegetable and animal oils and fats FOOD ML 6 1.065 
5. 1050 Dairy products FOOD ML 6 0.950 
6. 1061 Grain mill products FOOD ML 6 1.062 
7. 1062 Starches and starch products FOOD ML 6 1.034 
8. 1071 Bakery products FOOD ML 3 0.931 
9. 1072 Sugar FOOD ML 6 0.999 
10. 1073 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery FOOD ML 3 0.809 
11. 1074 Macaroni, noodles, couscous, etc. FOOD ML 6 1.007 
12. 1079 Other food products n.e.c. FOOD ML 6 0.936 
13. 1080 Prepared animal feeds FOOD ML 6 1.056 
14. 1101 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits FOOD ML 3 0.987 
15. 1102 Wines FOOD ML 3 1.082 
16. 1103 Malt liquors and malt FOOD ML 3 1.076 
17. 1104 Soft drinks, mineral waters, other bottled waters FOOD ML 3 0.947 
18. 1200 Tobacco products NC ML 3 0.911 
19. 1311 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres TEX ML 6 1.044 
20. 1312 Weaving of textiles TEX ML 6 0.957 
21. 1391 Knitted and crocheted fabrics TEX ML 6 0.943 
22. 1392 Made-up textile articles, except apparel TEX ML 3 0.832 
23. 1393 Carpets and rugs TEX ML 6 1.011 
24. 1394 Cordage, rope, twine and netting TEX ML 6 0.863 
25. 1399 Other textiles n.e.c. TEX ML 6 0.939 
26. 1410 Wearing apparel, except fur apparel TEX ML 3 1.006 
27. 1420 Articles of fur TEX ML 3 0.832 
28. 1430 Knitted and crocheted apparel TEX ML 3 1.057 
29. 1511 Tanning/dressing of leather; dressing of fur TEX ML 6 0.930 
30. 1512 Luggage, handbags, etc.; saddlery/harness TEX ML 3 0.906 
31. 1520 Footwear TEX ML 3 0.979 
32. 1610 Sawmilling and planing of wood WOOD ML 6 1.008 
33. 1621 Veneer sheets and wood-based panels WOOD ML 6 1.037 
34. 1622 Builders’ carpentry and joinery WOOD ML 6 0.900 
35. 1623 Wooden containers WOOD ML 6 1.188 
36. 1629 Other wood products; articles of cork, straw WOOD ML 6 0.938 
37. 1701 Pulp, paper and paperboard WOOD ML 6 1.082 
38. 1702 Corrugated paper and paperboard WOOD ML 6 0.997 
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39. 1709 Other articles of paper and paperboard WOOD ML 6 0.964 
40. 1811 Printing WOOD ML 6 0.514 
41. 1812 Service activities related to printing WOOD ML 6 0.973 
42. 1820 Reproduction of recorded media WOOD ML 3 0.690 
43. 1910 Coke oven products NC ML 6 1.005 
44. 1920 Refined petroleum products NC ML 6 1.071 
45. 2011 Basic chemicals CHE MH 6 1.013 
46. 2012 Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds CHE MH 6 1.004 
47. 2013 Plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms CHE MH 6 1.059 
48. 2021 Pesticides and other agrochemical products CHE MH 3 0.847 
49. 2022 Paints, varnishes; printing ink and mastics CHE MH 3 0.921 
50. 2023 Soap, cleaning and cosmetic preparations CHE MH 3 0.954 
51. 2029 Other chemical products n.e.c. CHE MH 3 0.927 
52. 2030 Man-made fibres CHE MH 3 1.064 
53. 2100 Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc. CHE H 3 0.844 
54. 2211 Rubber tyres and tubes RUB M 3 0.909 
55. 2219 Other rubber products RUB M 3 0.939 
56. 2220 Plastics products RUB M 3 0.926 
57. 2310 Glass and glass products MET M 6 0.956 
58. 2391 Refractory products MET M 6 0.954 
59. 2392 Clay building materials MET M 6 1.007 
60. 2393 Other porcelain and ceramic products MET M 6 0.910 
61. 2394 Cement, lime and plaster MET M 6 1.058 
62. 2395 Articles of concrete, cement and plaster MET M 6 0.984 
63. 2396 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone MET M 6 0.992 
64. 2399 Other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. MET M 6 0.988 
65. 2410 Basic iron and steel MET M 6 1.009 
66. 2420 Basic precious and other non-ferrous metals MET M 6 0.986 
67. 2431 Casting of iron and steel MET M 6 0.874 
68. 2511 Structural metal products MET ML 3 0.841 
69. 2512 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal MET ML 3 0.909 
70. 2513 Steam generators, excl. hot water boilers MET ML 3 0.960 
71. 2593 Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware MET ML 3 0.861 
72. 2599 Other fabricated metal products n.e.c. MET ML 3 0.910 
73. 2610 Electronic components and boards SCI H 3 0.833 
74. 2620 Computers and peripheral equipment SCI H 3 0.878 
75. 2630 Communication equipment SCI H 3 0.769 
76. 2640 Consumer electronics SCI H 3 0.834 
77. 2651 Measuring/testing/navigating equipment, etc. SCI H 3 0.823 
Continued on next page 
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78. 2652 Watches and clocks SCI H 3 0.847 
79. 2660 Irradiation/electromedical equipment, etc. SCI H 3 0.777 
80. 2670 Optical instruments and photographic equipment SCI H 3 0.716 
81. 2710 Electric motors, generators, transformers, etc. ELE MH 3 0.783 
82. 2720 Batteries and accumulators ELE MH 3 0.872 
83. 2731 Fibre optic cables ELE MH 6 0.907 
84. 2732 Other electronic and electric wires and cables ELE MH 6 0.835 
85. 2733 Wiring devices ELE MH 6 0.652 
86. 2740 Electric lighting equipment ELE MH 6 0.875 
87. 2750 Domestic appliances ELE MH 3 0.928 
88. 2790 Other electrical equipment ELE MH 3 0.849 
89. 2811 Engines/turbines, excl. aircraft, vehicle engines MACH MH 3 1.000 
90. 2812 Fluid power equipment MACH MH 3 1.005 
91. 2813 Other pumps, compressors, taps and valves MACH MH 3 0.831 
92. 2814 Bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements MACH MH 3 0.965 
93. 2815 Ovens, furnaces and furnace burners MACH MH 3 0.894 
94. 2816 Lifting and handling equipment MACH MH 3 0.813 
95. 2817 Office machinery, excl. computers, etc. MACH MH 3 0.698 
96. 2818 Power-driven hand tools MACH MH 3 0.906 
97. 2819 Other general-purpose machinery MACH MH 3 0.894 
98. 2821 Agricultural and forestry machinery MACH MH 3 0.795 
99. 2822 Metal-forming machinery and machine tools MACH MH 3 0.765 
100. 2823 Machinery for metallurgy MACH MH 3 0.920 
101. 2824 Mining, quarrying and construction machinery MACH MH 3 0.765 
102. 2825 Food/beverage/tobacco processing machinery MACH MH 3 0.820 
103. 2826 Textile/apparel/leather production machinery MACH MH 3 0.865 
104. 2829 Other special-purpose machinery MACH MH 3 0.798 
105. 2910 Motor vehicles TRA MH 3 0.877 
106. 2920 Automobile bodies, trailers and semi-trailers TRA MH 3 0.810 
107. 2930 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles TRA MH 3 0.911 
108. 3011 Building of ships and floating structures TRA M 3 0.829 
109. 3012 Building of pleasure and sporting boats TRA M 3 0.624 
110. 3020 Railway locomotives and rolling stock TRA MH 3 0.891 
111. 3030 Air and spacecraft and related machinery TRA H 3 0.707 
112. 3091 Motorcycles TRA MH 3 0.839 
113. 3092 Bicycles and invalid carriages TRA MH 3 0.844 
114. 3099 Other transport equipment n.e.c. TRA MH 3 0.670 
115. 3100 Furniture OTH ML 3 0.882 
Continued on next page 
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116. 3211 Jewellery and related articles OTH M 3 0.773 
117. 3212 Imitation jewellery and related articles OTH M 6 0.742 
118. 3220 Musical instruments OTH M 3 0.796 
119. 3230 Sports goods OTH M 3 0.880 
120. 3240 Games and toys OTH M 3 0.899 
121. 3250 Medical and dental instruments and supplies OTH MH 3 0.750 
122. 3290 Other manufacturing n.e.c OTH M 3 0.922 
Note: Allocation to 11 sectoral groups is based on authors’ own categorisation. Allocation to R&D groups is based on the OECD 
Taxonomy of Economic Activities based on R&D Intensity. The value of elasticity of substitution between different varieties of 
the same product is set at 3 for those industries that largely manufacture differentiated and at 6 for those industries that manufacture 
homogenous goods. Allocation of manufacturing industries into those that produce differentiated and homogenous goods is based 
on authors’ own categorisation. The value of elasticity of demand is derived from Ghodsi et al. (2016b). List of abbreviations: a) 
Sectoral group: CHE = Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; ELE = Electrical; FOOD = Food processing; MACH = Machinery; MET 
= Metals and non-metallic minerals; NC = Not classified; OTH = Other; RUB = Rubber and plastic; SCI = Electronic and 
scientific; TEX = Textiles, apparel and footwear; TRA = Transport; WOOD = Wood, paper and printing; b) R&D group: H = 
High R&D; MH = Medium-high R&D; M = Medium R&D; ML = Medium-low R&D. 
 
 
B  Modelling demand for and supply of differentiated products 
 
The three models used in the projections in this paper use variants of a two-stage Dixit-Stiglitz constant 
elasticity of substitution demand system for differentiated products. As is noted in the paper, the model is 
a partial equilibrium model in which each of the sectors is treated as independent of the others. 
Overall demand for the sector’s product in a particular national market is represented by the output 
index X, which is assumed to be a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of the sales of different 
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where the individual xi represent the quantities of the different varieties of the good, the ai are parameters 
which sum to 1, and X is the quantity index that aggregates the different varieties. 
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If it is assumed that overall demand X is a constant elasticity function of the price index P with elasticity 
−µ, then the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand can be derived from (2) and (3) as 
 
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −𝜎𝜎 + (𝜎𝜎 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 
      (5) 
𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = (𝜎𝜎 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 
       (6) 
 
where si = pix i/PX is the share of variety i in sales of the product in this market, noting that, because cross-
price effects enter only through the price index, the cross-price elasticity depends on the market share of 
the variety whose price is changing, not on the characteristics of the product whose demand is changing 
as a result. 
 
 
B.1.  The Armington model 
 
In the first model using this structure, we suppose that goods are differentiated only by country of origin 
and are sold in perfectly competitive markets. With four countries in our model, there are four varieties of 
the product sold in each of the four national markets. Price is equal to marginal cost, and we assume that 
there are decreasing returns on a market-by-market basis: marginal cost in each market rises with sales in 
that market but is unaffected by sales in other markets. The decreasing returns are at a mild rate: the assumed 
elasticity of supply is high. In each country market, (5) relates the elasticity of demand for imports from 
each country source (and for the home-produced variety) to the underlying elasticities and to market shares. 
It is easily seen that the same equation gives the overall elasticity of import demand; that is, the response to 




B.2.  Imperfect competition 
 
In this version of the model, products are differentiated by producing firm, so firms have some market 
power. Now (5) determines the elasticity which enters firms’ pricing decisions. However, the relationship 
needs careful interpretation. Even though we are working with a somewhat disaggregated classification of 
manufactures, from the perspective of competition between product varieties the classification is too 
aggregate: a typical sector should be thought of as consisting of several sub-sectors each of which produces 
a distinct set of product varieties. 
Applying the partial equilibrium approach at the sub-sector level, the market share relevant to the firm’s 
elasticity of demand is the firm’s market share in the relevant sub-sector. If the sub-sectors are symmetric, 
then s i, the share of firms from country i will be the same for each sub-sector, but from the perspective of 
the individual firm, the it is its market share in the sub-sector that is relevant to its pricing decision, so in 
(5) si is replaced by s i/ni , where ni is the number of (equal-sized) firms operating in the sub-sector. 
(i) In the first version of the imperfect competition model, we assume that firms have constant 
marginal cost, so the only source of economies of scale comes from the spreading of fixed cost over a larger 
output. 
(ii) In the second version, the one used to generate the main results in the paper, we assume that 
firms’ marginal cost decreases with output, so there is a second source of scale economies. This gives rise 
to a multi-market linkage: if a firm expands its sales in one market, its marginal cost falls and therefore in 
all other markets its price falls and its sales expand. 
